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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE CHAPMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the lower court err in failing to suppress all evidence 
relating to a charge of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol because of an illegal traffic stop initially made by the 
arresting officer? Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 
(Utah App. 1989) . Whether the requisite reasonable suspicion was 
present to support an investigatory detention by a police officer 
presents a question of fact. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987). The standard for review in such cases is 
whether the denial of a motion to suppress was "clearly 
erroneous". State v. Ash, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous if it is without 
adequate evidentiary support in the record or if it is induced by 
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an erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 13, 14 (1990) (a finding not supported by substantial 
competent evidence is clearly erroneous). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Amendment 4, United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The record in this case is a confusing maze of procedural 
irregularities which make it difficult for the parties and this 
Court to properly comprehend. It is unknown why the Third 
Circuit Court of West Valley has failed in its obligation to 
properly preserve the record in a coherent form but regardless 
of the reasons the record must be dealt with in its present 
condition. 
On February 11, 1989 Defendant was issued a citation for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. On February 22 a not 
guilty plea was entered by Defendant's attorney Larry Long. (R. 
4). On March 7, 1989 a "per se" hearing was held in the 
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Department of Driver's License Division for the purpose of 
determining whether Defendant would maintain his driver's 
license. A separate transcript of this hearing has been included 
in the record on appeal, 
A Motion to Suppress the evidence was filed by the defendant 
and a hearing was scheduled for April 3, 1989. (R. 7, 8-20). A 
memorandum dated April 19, 1989 in opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress the evidence was filed by the City. This 
memorandum is contained in a separate envelope of the record and 
is not numbered in the court file. 
On April 25, 1989 Defendant objected to the Statement of 
Facts contained in the memorandum and requested an evidentiary 
hearing on the Motion to Suppress. (R. 21-22). An evidentiary 
hearing was scheduled for June 26, 1989. (R. 25). Upon the 
request of the City a continuation of the hearing was granted and 
the hearing was moved to July 10, 1989. (R. 27). At the same 
time a jury trial was set for August 23, 1989. 
!*• is believed by Defendant that the evidentiary hearing was 
held on July 10 although there is nothing in the file to indicate 
what occurred at the suppression hearing with the exception of 
some handwritten notes presumably by the court on a sheet of 
paper. (R. 27). A copy of this suppression hearing has been 
transcribed by Defendant from the tape recording of the 
proceeding. A new memorandum was subsequently filed by the 
defendant on July 21, 1989 (R. 30-35). 
On August 23, 1989, the time set for trial, the Court 
continued the trial until October 17, 1989. (R. 43). On October 
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4, 1989 a motion was made by Defendant to continue the jury trial 
on the grounds that no decision had yet been rendered as to 
defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence. (R. 45). At the 
same time a motion was made by Defendant for a second evidentiary 
hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and a request that the 
Court render a decision on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and to 
submit a written decision of the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. (R. 48-49) . 
On October 17, 1989 Defendant appeared before the lower 
court and entered a conditional plea of guilty. (R. 56-59). A 
separate transcript of that hearing made from the tape recording 
has been filed with this Court. 
A Notice of Appeal dated November 3, 1989, with a mailing 
certificate of November 17, 1989 and a filing date of November 
24, 1989 appeals from the October 17, 1989 judgment. (R. 
64-65). The "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" of 
the lower court do not contain a filing date but are dated 
November 29, 1989. The Court basically denied Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress on the basis that the totality of circumstances gave 
the officer reasonable grounds to stop the defendant. A copy of 
these findings is included in the Appendix. 
A second copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal dated November 
3, 1989 is contained in the file with a new filing date of 
December 4, 1989. (R. 71-72). 
Despite repeated requests from Defendant the Clerk of the 
Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department, failed to file the 
Notice of Appeal with this Court. Defendant according filed a 
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docketing statement with this Court on March 7, 1990 even though 
there was no official appeal before the court. On April 27, 1990 
Defendant's attorney received a letter from a deputy clerk of 
this Court informing Defendant that the appeal had not yet been 
forwarded from the trial court and that the docketing statement 
would be held until May 7, 1990 and thereafter returned if the 
appeal was not filed by the Circuit Court Clerk, See Appendix 
to this Brief. The Notice of Appeal together with the record of 
appeal was finally filed with this Court on May 29, 1990 some six 
months after the original appeal was instituted by the 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is undisputed that on Februarly 11, 1989 Defendant was 
stopped by Officer Corey Acocks of the West Valley City Police 
Department and was given a citation for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law" of the Circuit Court Judge from which this appeal is taken 
does not indicate from what source the "Findings" are derived. 
As noted earlier a civil hearing was held before the Department 
of Drivers License Division before a hearing officer in 
accordance with Utah Administrative Procedure Act 41-2-130. In 
addition, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Circuit 
Court at which time Officer Acocks also testified. Since these 
hearings were the only evidentiary base for Findings of Fact they 
will both be briefly summarized. 
The March 7 hearing before the Department of Drivers' 
License Division involved solely the testimony of Officer Corey 
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Acocks. The examination of Officer Acocks was conducted by the 
hearing officer. Acocks stated that he first observed the 
defendant's car at 3400 West 3500 South driving eastbound. The 
officer was westbound on 3500 South and observed the vehicle had 
no headlights. This occurred at approximately 11:10 p.m. The 
officer stated he flashed his headlights two separate times but 
did not receive a response. He therefore made a "U" turn and was 
stopped for a traffic signal at 3200 West before he caught up 
with the vehicle at 2600 West and activated his overhead lights. 
The defendant pulled over immediately upon seeing the lights. 
(Tr. 5, March 7, 1989 hearing). 
At that point Mr. Chapman exited his vehicle and gave the 
officer his Utah drivers license. The Officer thought that Mr. 
Chapman may have been a little mentally handicapped since he was 
very slow in his responses,. After checking with the dispatcher 
he returned to the vehicle and talked to him through the window 
at which time he smelled an odor of alcohol. (Tr. 6). 
The officer stated that he was able to determine that the 
odor was coming from in and about the vehicle. (Tr. 7). Mr. 
Chapman upon being asked if he had had anything to drink replied 
he had had a couple of drinks a half hour before. The officer 
then asked him if he would take some field sobriety tests and he 
agreed to do so. He was given the finger count, leg lift, walk 
and turn, ABCfs and NYSTAGMUS tests. (Id.). After taking the 
field tests the officer arrested Defendant for driving under the 
influence. (Tr. 8). Subsequently, he was given a chemical 
breath test. (Tr. 9-11). 
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Upon cross examination the following dialogue occurred: 
Q. MR, LONG: Officer Acocks, you said that when you 
first noticed the vehicle, the headlights were off; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In your police report it says the headlight, as in 
singular; which was it? 
A. It was both headlights. 
Q. It was both headlights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, in other words, the lights weren't on? 
A. The headlights weren't on. 
Q. And what about when you caught up to him? 
A. I did not notice that they were on at that time, 
either. The taillights, or the brakelights were, 
but were dim, I thought that it may be a faulty 
equipment problem. 
(Tr. 11-12, March 7, 1989) . 
The testimony given by the officer in the per se hearing 
before the Department of Motor Vehicles was in direct 
contradiction to his testimony given at the suppression hearing 
before the Circuit Court Judge. The following dialogue occurred 
between the prosecutor and Officer Acocks: 
Q. MR STONEY: Did you do anything as the vehicle 
approached in your direction? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q, And what did you do? 
A. I flashed my headlights off and then back on again 
two times. 
Q. And what is that a common signal for? 
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To try to get the other driver's attention to turn on 
the headlights. 
Did the other driver in the vehicle do anything with 
his headlights? 
The headlights did not come on. 
Did the vehicle eventually pass you? 
Yes, it did. 
Going in the opposite direction? 
Yes, sir. 
What did you do at that point? 
I turned my vehicle around, making a "U" turn, and went 
in pursuit of the vehicle. 
When you made the "U" turn, could you still see the 
vehicle? 
Yes, sir. 
Had you lost sight of the vehicle at any time, then, 
during the "UM turn or before then? 
Maybe briefly for a moment (unintelligible), the 
vehicle making the turn. I made the turn in safety 
for myself and others; but when I turned back around 
I noticed that there were no taillights on the 
vehicle and still pursued. 
You're sure that was the same vehicle? 
Yes. 
When you say "briefly for a moment" you lost sight of 
it when making the turn, were you in the process of 
making sure you were making a safe turn? 
To make sure no other vehicle was around, I may have 
lost sight of the vehicle. 
Were there any other vehicles that were able to get 
between you and this other, this pickup that you saw? 
I don't recall at this time. 
Okay, what kind of vehicle was it that you were 
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following? 
A* A Datsun pickup. 
Q. You say there were no taillights either at this point? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far behind the vehicle were you when you started 
following it? 
A. An estimate would probably be, by the time I turned 
around, maybe 100 yards. 
Q. Okay. It wasn't speeding (unintelligible) or anything? 
A. No. 
Q. You noticed no other violations up to that point? 
A. No sir. 
(Suppression Hearing, pp. 4-5). 
On cross examination again the officer stated there were no 
taillights present. 
Q. Didn't you—when you turned around, what attracted 
you to the car was that there were no taillights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you couldn't tell whether the headlights on that 
vehicle were on or not? 
A. Not at that point, no, I could not. As I passed 
the headlights were off on the vehicle. 
Q. That section of the roadway right there, is almost 
like broad daylight at that time of night because 
of all the street lights, isn't it? 
A. It's very well lit, uh huh. 
(Suppression Hearing, p. 9) 
In a later portion of the cross examination the officer stated 
the following: 
Q. Now you told me that the taillights were out. 
They were totally out of the vehicle you chased, 
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is that right? 
A- Yes sir. 
Q. And what about the brake lights? 
A. As the vehicle stopped, I did notice that a dim light 
was coming from the taillights. 
Q. Well, let's see, in other words you thought that the 
brakes were faulty, the brake lights were faulty? 
A. I don't know at that point what I thought. 
Q. Did you ever follow it up to try to find out, you 
know, why the brake lights were so dim? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you—when you got up to the vehicle, did you 
find out whether the headlights were in fact off? 
A. I don't recall at the point of looking at the 
headlights after I made contact with Mr. Chapman. 
(Suppression Hearing, pp. 20-21) (Emphasis added). 
During the suppression hearing the officer testified that 
when Mr. Chapman left his vehicle and approached the officer on 
foot that he cooperated with him fully and had no difficulty in 
producing his drivers license. (Suppression Hearing, pp. 
11-12), There was no testimony by the officer that he had any 
suspicion of Mr. Chapman being intoxicated until the time he 
returned to Mr. Chapman's car and smelled alcohol coming from the 
vehicle. (Suppressin Hearing, p. 16). 
The Court gave an oral decision denying the motion to 
suppress at the conclusion of the suppression hearing. 
(Suppression Hearing, pp. 26-27) . Subsequently, some five months 
later the court entered specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law concerning the motion. 
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Defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest with the 
condition that he could appeal the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's factual finding that the officer had a 
reasonable basis to stop Mr, Chapman is not based upon adequate 
evidentiary support and the Court's conclusion that a pretext 
stop did not occur is erroneous- The officer's sole basis for 
stopping the Chapman vehicle was the alleged failure to have 
properly operating headlights and taillights. As to headlights, 
while the officer stated that the lights were out when he passed 
the vehicle he could not recall whether they were out at the time 
of the stop or whether he even checked to see if they were 
operating. As to taillights his testimony was extremely 
contradictory. In the per se hearing he stated that the 
taillights were properly working but that the brake lights were 
dim. In the suppression hearing he stated that the taillights 
were out completely and that only the brake lights came on in a 
dimmed condition. The testimony of the officer is simply 
insufficient to provide a factual basis for the stop and the 
ensuing arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS 
NOT JUSTIFIED SINCE THE OFFICER DID 
NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS TO SUSPECT 
THAT CHAPMAN WAS VIOLATING A TRAFFIC 
REGULATION. 
In establishing the constitutional standard to stop a 
particular automobile, the United States Supreme Court has 
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clearly denied an officer the right to randomly stop cars on 
public roads. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The 
Utah Supreme Court has also approved this principle. State v. 
Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1983). 
A police officer may, however, stop an automobile for a 
traffic violation in the officer's presence. However, it is 
impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor 
arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious 
crime. United States v. Millio, 588 F.Supp. 45, 49 (D.N.Y. 
1984) . 
In determining whether a stop for a traffic violation and 
subsequent arrest is a pretext, the totality of the circumstances 
governs. United States v.. Birgnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885. 
In making this determination the subjective intent of the officer 
is irrelevant. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's 
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him 
at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at 
the time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463 (1985). 
Applying these principles, this Court in State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) formulated the following standard: 
Thus, in determining whether Officer Smith's stop 
of Sierra for driving in the left lane was an 
unconstitutional pretext, we focus on whether a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, 
would have stopped Sierra to issue a warning for 
driving in the left lane. The proper inquiry does not 
focus on whether the officer could validly have made 
the stop. This analysis is congruent with that 
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developed by other jurisdictions under the Fourth 
Amendment. 754 P.2d at 978, 
This Court approved the reasoning utilized to protect 
individuals from pretextual misdemeanor traffic arrests by 
quoting a treatise on search and seizure. This treatise stated: 
Given the facts, as noted, that Min most 
jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses the 
determination of whether to issue a citation or effect 
a full arrest is discretionary with the officer," and 
that "very few drivers can tranverse any appreciable 
distance without violating some traffic regulation," 
this [pretextual traffic stop] is indeed a frightening 
possibility. It is apparent that virtually everyone 
who ventures out onto the public streets and highways 
may then, with little effort by the police, be placed 
in a position where he is subject to a full search. 
Nor is one put at ease by what evidence exists as to 
what police practices in this regard; it is clear that 
this subterfuge is employed as a means for searching 
for evidence on the persons of suspects who could not 
be lawfully arrested for the crimes of which they are 
suspected. 754 P.2d at 972 quoting 5 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure §5.2(e) 2d. Ed. 1987. 
In Sierra this Court held that the stop of defendant's 
vehicle was not constitutionally justified as an incident to 
citation for a traffic violation for driving unlawfully in the 
left lane since a reasonable officer would not have stopped 
defendant's car when defendant was in the left lane for 40 to 50 
seconds, passing two cars during that time. 
Two additional cases decided by this Court are also helpful 
to the issue involved in this case. In State v. Smith, 781 
P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) a car was stopped by an officer because 
it turned into a motel driveway without signaling. This Court 
held that the stop was legal since it was "a clear-cut traffic 
violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and issue 
citations." 
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In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, filed 135 Utah Adv. Rpt. 78 (1990) a highway patrol 
trooper noticed that the defendant's left-hand signal remained 
blinking for two miles after passing a motor home. This Court in 
upholding the stop stated: 
In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment 
problem with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn 
signal was malfunctioning or he had negligently failed 
to turn it off. Courts consistently have held that a 
police officer can stop a car when he or she believes 
the car's safety equipment is not functioning 
properly. Id. at 882. 
Thus, there is no question that under certain circumstances 
an officer may legally stop a vehicle for equipment problems 
without a claim of a pretext stop being asserted. In the instant 
case, however, the facts do not justify the reasonable 
hypothetical officer in pulling over the Chapman vehicle. 
The officer testified that he first observed the Chapman 
vehicle passing in the opposite direction with no headlights. He 
acknowledged that the street was brightly lit aad did not state 
that he considered Mr. Chapman to be driving in any hazardous 
manner because of the failure to have his lights on. In any 
event, he proceeded to make a MU" turn and to follow the Chapman 
vehicle which he claimed had no taillights showing at the time 
the observation was made going in the same direction as the 
Chapman vehicle. 
Obviously, the officer did not consider the light problem 
serious since he stopped at a red light rather than going through 
it was he could have under the emergency vehicle provisions of 
Utah law. Assuming that the Chapman vehicle was the same one 
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which he initially saw prior to his stop at the intersection he 
stated that the taillights were now working prior to the stop 
although he considered them to be slightly dim. After stopping 
the vehicle he had no recollection whether the headlights were 
working or not. 
Defendant would contend that a reasonable hypothetical 
officer would conclude that if the taillights were suddenly 
turned on that the driver, upon entering a darker section of the 
highway, realized he had not activated his lighting system and 
therefore had turned on both the headlights and taillights and 
that there was no longer a danger present on the road. Moreover, 
a reasonable officer could have passed the Chapman vehicle to 
confirm whether the headlights were now operating. 
The failure of the officer to even observe whether the 
headlights were on or not after the stop raises a serious 
question as to his initial motives. Also, no effort was made to 
check the taillights or the brake lights which also allegedly 
were a concern of the officer. 
It is unlikely that a reasonable hypothetical officer would 
have stopped the Chapman vehicle for having momentarily failed to 
previously have had its lights on. The officer himself stated in 
the suppression hearing: 
Q. So if you had stopped Mr. Chapman and he hadn't— 
there was no evidence he had been drinking, would 
you have let him go? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You wouldn't have given him a citation? 
A. Not for—maybe not for driving with his headlights 
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out. I've pulled people over in the past for not 
having their headlights on, and they have honestly 
just not had them on. And I've done it for safety 
reasons. 
Q. So you just give them a warning, then? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Suppression Hearing, Tr. p. 11). 
Defendant submits, therefore, that while the officer may 
have initially had a reason to pursue the Chapman vehicle when he 
believed that the lights were not on this reason disintegrated 
once he approached the vehicle and saw the taillights working and 
failed to ascertain whether the headlights were in fact on. The 
testimony is undisputed that there were no other driving 
violations occurring nor did the defendant drive in any 
unreasonable manner. Even after he exited his vehicle and gave 
the officer his drivers license the officer did not suspect any 
alcoholic use. It was only after the officer approached the 
vehicle and could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the 
driver's seat that he became suspicious of drinking activity. 
The lower court evidently based its opinion upon both the 
testimony taken at the per se hearing before the Department of 
Motor Vehicles and the testimony before the court at the 
suppression hearing. Elements of both testimonies appear in the 
court's Findings of Fact. The lower court essentially chose to 
disregard any contradiction between the two forms of testimony 
concerning the taillights even though the per se hearing 
testimony indicated that the taillights were on at the time of 
the stop while the suppression hearing testmony indicated they 
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were never on while the vehicle was being chased. The court in 
its Findings of Fact reconciled this otherwise irreconcileable 
testimony by finding that initially the taillights were not on 
when the chase began but that they were on at the time the 
vehicle was stopped by the officer. As mentioned earlier, if 
this scenario of the facts is utilized then the officer clearly 
should have suspected that the driver had now activated his 
lighting system and that the headlights were on as well as the 
taillights. If, on the other hand, the taillights were always 
out as testified in the suppression hearing then the officer's 
testimony in the per se hearing is completely inconsistent. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that under the totality of the 
circumstances it was unreasonable for Officer Acocks or for any 
officer to stop the Chapman vehicle without further investigation 
as to the lighting system or, at a minimum, to ascertain the 
condition of the lighting system after the stop had actually 
occurred. The complete failure of the officer to even know which 
lights were on or off seriously negates any claim for a valid 
stop. 
For this reason, the lower court erred in denying 
Defendant's Motion for Suppression and this Court should reverse 
and hold that all evidence acquired subsequent to the stop was 
inadmissible. 
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In Re: State v. Dale H. Chapman 
Civil No. 892002005TC 
Dear Ms. Long: 
You filed with this Court the docketing statement on 
the above named case on March 27, 1990, and to date, the 
appeal has not been forwarded from the trial court. We 
will hold your filings until May 7, 1990, and unless an 
appeal is received from the trial court by that date, it 
will be returned to you. 
Sincerely, 
y 
' / ^ 
Janice Ray 
„ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
WEST VALLEY CITY, ! 
Plaintiff, ; 
VS. ! 
DALE H. CHAPMAN, 
Defendant. 
I FINDINGS OF FACT 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: AND ORDER 
: NO. 892002005TC 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On February 11, 1989, at approximately 11:30 p.m. Officer 
Acocks, while on routine patrol, observed a vehicle traveling 
eastbound on 3500 South at 3400 West with no headlights. Officer 
Acocks was traveling westbound and as the two vehicles 
approached one another from opposite directions, Officer Acocks 
flashed his lights as a signal to the vehicle to turn on it's 
headlights, however, there was no response. After the vehicles 
passed one another, Officer Acocks also noticed that the tail 
lights were not on. Officer Acocks initiated a U-turn, 
proceeded to follow the vehicle, however, the Officer's pursuit 
was interrupted by a stop light. The pursuit continued and the 
vehicle was stopped, as the vehicle came to a stop the officer 
noticed dim or faint tail lights. At that time, Officer Acocks 
did not notice if the headlights were on or off, furthermore, 
the vehicle did not violate any other traffic law, nor did 
Officer Acocks notice any unususal or erratic driving pattern. 
Additionally, Officer Acocks has stopped numerous vehicles in 
the past few months for driving without headlights because of 
the traffic hazard. 
As Officer Acocks exited his vehicle and approached the 
Defendant, the Defendant Dale H. Chapman exited his vehicle and 
began walking towards Officer Acocks. The officer noticed that 
the Defendant's balance was unsteady and that his speech was 
slow. Officer Acocks obtained the Defendant's driver's license 
for identification and both returned to their respective 
vehicles. Officer Acocks then approached the Defendant again 
and when the Defendnat rolled down his car window, Officer 
Acocks could smell an odor of alcohol emanating from the 
vehicle. Officer Acocks asked the Defendnat if he had been 
drinking. The Defendant responded, "had a couple a half hour 
ago". The Defnedant consented to performing field sobriety 
tests. 
Based upon observing the vehicle operating without 
headlights and tail lights, odor of alcohol, unsteady balance, 
statement of drinking alcohol, and poor performance on the field 
sobriety tests, Officer Acocks placed the Defendant under arrest 
for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of 
41-6-44 of the Revised Ordinances of West Valley City. 
The Defendant moves this Court for an order Suppressing 
evidence obtained by Officer Acocks based upon the grounds that, 
Officer Acocks1 stop of the Defendant was not based upon a 
reasonable articulable suspicion in violation of the Defendant's 
Fourth Amendment Rights. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer Acocks' observation of the Defendant's vehicle 
operating without headlights and dim tail lights is a reasonable 
articulable suspicion, not a mere hunch, that the Defendant was 
violating the law by creating a traffic hazard. 
2. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, and totality 
of the circumstances, Officer Acocks' stop of the Defendant for 
a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence was 
reasonable and one which a reasonable officer would perform. 
Therefore, the stop was not a pretext. 
3. Statements made by the Defendant to the officer, were 
investigatory in nature and do not amount to custodial 
interogation. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, IT _ HEREBY -RDERED that 
Defendant .*;i£cU-L e  
DATED this • ,-, vembey, ^ 8 9 J ^  ' ' A 
TYRON?^.- MEDLEY" 
Thir'i, Ci rcui t Court Jud-£ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a tru€i and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
to L. Long, Attorney for Defendant, and Paula Houston, Assistant 
City Prosecutor. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1989. 
